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Abstract Evolutionary applications of game theory present
one of the most pedagogically accessible varieties of genu-
ine, contemporary theoretical biology. We present here
Oyun (OY-oon, http://charlespence.net/oyun), a program
designed to run iterated prisoner's dilemma tournaments,
competitions between prisoner's dilemma strategies devel-
oped by the students themselves. Using this software, stu-
dents are able to readily design and tweak their own
strategies, and to see how they fare both in round-robin
tournaments and in “evolutionary” tournaments, where the
scores in a given “generation” directly determine contribu-
tion to the population in the next generation. Oyun is freely
available, runs on Windows, Mac, and Linux computers,
and the process of creating new prisoner's dilemma strate-
gies is both easy to teach and easy for students to grasp. We
illustrate with two interesting examples taken from actual
use of Oyun in the classroom.
Keywords Game theory . Prisoner's dilemma . Altruism .
Natural selection
Game-theoretic models in evolutionary theory have been
used to explain many diverse phenomena, including altru-
ism (Bowles 2006; Fletcher and Zwick 2007),1 frequency-
dependent selection (Nowak and Sigmund 2004), eusocial-
ity (Nowak et al. 2010), and many other facets of evolution
(Vincent and Brown 2005). Importantly, they are also one of
the most pedagogically accessible varieties of sophisticated
biological modeling. We present here Oyun (OY-oon, http://
charlespence.net/oyun),2 a program designed to run iterated
prisoner's dilemma tournaments—competitions between
strategies developed by the students themselves. Using this
software, students are able to readily design and tweak their
own prisoner's dilemma strategies, and to see how those
strategies fare both in round-robin tournaments and in “evo-
lutionary” tournaments, where the scores in a given “gener-
ation” directly determine contribution to the population in
the next generation. We describe the motivation behind
teaching the iterated prisoner's dilemma, show how students
can craft their own strategies in Oyun, and then show the
results of some sample tournaments based on two surprising
results from the classroom: one showing host/parasite be-
havior, and the other showing the detection of anti-social
behavior.
Background
When we are investigating biological cases in which coop-
eration of various varieties has evolved, often a pattern
1 Altruism is here meant in the restricted sense of biological or evolu-
tionary altruism—“costly helping” behavior that decreases fitness
(Allchin 2009a, p. 592), not behavior with an “intent to help” more
generally (which is often termed “psychological” altruism). See Sober
(1988) for a thorough discussion of the scope and limits of evolution-
ary altruism.
2 Oyun is a word for “game” in Turkish, Azerbaijani, and allied Turkic
languages.
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appears—these examples seem particularly amenable to
“freeloading” or “cheating.” Consider the case of predator
inspection in guppies (Dugatkin and Alfieri 1991). In some
species of fish, a small number of individuals in a school
(the “inspectors”) will leave the group to slowly approach
and gather information about a much larger possible preda-
tor. Now, consider the possible fitness advantage or disad-
vantage that might hold between each pair of fish in a group.
If both fish choose to inspect a predator, they gain informa-
tion about the predator while sharing the risk. If neither
inspect, they lack the information about the predator but
neither incurs any risk. But the best outcome of all for any
individual fish is the outcome in which the other inspects
(incurring all the risk) while it itself stays back. It is best, it
seems, for any individual fish to be a freeloader, to refuse to
contribute to the group's mutual benefit.
This structure of incentives, as it turns out, is quite
common in nature—examples include food gathering, tree
height, the expansion of plant roots, body size, and even the
replication of virus populations (see Easley and Kleinberg
2010, Chap. 7). Axelrod and Hamilton (1981, p. 1392)
describe the same pattern in the differential response of
bacteria to environmental change and in the behavior of
primates. It is also apparent in human behavior, such as
deciding whether to shoot at the enemy during trench war-
fare in World War I (Axelrod 1984, pp. 73–87). A particu-
larly pedagogically important example is the evolution of
behavior that conforms to moral norms—it is easy to see
that being a “moral cheater” while those around you do the
right thing presents many of the same advantages as the sort
of freeloading described here. The importance of teaching
the evolution of morality has been stressed by Allchin
(2009a, b).
What's more, this network of incentives is equivalent to a
well-studied problem in game theory: the prisoner's dilem-
ma. In this example, we are asked to consider two impris-
oned members of a gang, one of whom has committed a
crime. The state lacks enough evidence to convict either
one, so they attempt to get each prisoner to turn the other
in. Each prisoner (confined separately and unable to com-
municate with his partner) is given the choice to remain
silent (to “cooperate” with their partner) or to turn state's
evidence and testify against the other (to “defect” against
their partner). If both cooperate (remain silent), they will
each receive a small jail term. If both defect (turn the other
in), the state knows that one of them must be lying and gives
both a moderate jail sentence. If one defects and another
cooperates, however, the defector walks free for his assis-
tance, and the cooperator receives the maximum possible
sentence.
We can now formalize this structure using the tools of
game theory. Turn the various possible “outcomes” for the
two prisoners into numerical “payoff” values—with higher
“payoff” for lower jail time. If both prisoners choose to
cooperate, they each receive a payoff of three (the light
sentence). Should one cooperate and the other defect, the
cooperator gets the “sucker's payoff” of zero (the maximum
sentence), and the defector gets five (walking away free, the
best of all). Should they both defect, however, they both
receive a payoff of one (the moderate sentence; see Table 1).
So it is better for both if both cooperate than if both defect.
But now, consider whether it is more beneficial for me to
cooperate or to defect. If my opponent chooses to defect,
then I should defect, to receive a payoff of one instead of
zero. On the other hand, if my opponent chooses to cooper-
ate, then I should also defect, to receive a payoff of five
instead of three. Defection, therefore, is (in the terminology
of game theory) strongly dominant—regardless of what my
opponent does, defecting gives me a higher payoff than
cooperating, so it seems that I should choose to defect even
if I don't know what he'll do. Similar reasoning on my
opponent's part leads to the conclusion that he should defect
as well. Mutual defection is thus recommended by domi-
nance reasoning, despite the fact that it would be better for
both of us if we both were to cooperate rather than defect.
The evolution of cooperation in situations with the struc-
ture of the prisoner's dilemma therefore poses an interesting
problem for evolutionary theory. For in cases in which
phenomena in nature have the structure of the prisoner's
dilemma, it seems that cooperation cannot evolve:
defecting is always individually beneficial, regardless
of what the partner's action is, and defection will thus
be evolutionarily favored.3 And yet, cooperation seems
to have evolved in some of these situations—guppies do
inspect predators.4 How can we explain these instances
of evolved cooperation?
One method for escaping the dilemma was brought to the
fore by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) and led to Axelrod's
seminal book, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984). The
key, as Axelrod and Hamilton argue, is to move to the
iterated prisoner's dilemma. In many real-world cases, in-
cluding the example of predator inspection in guppies, indi-
viduals each interact repeatedly with a limited number of
others, and so (1) each individual is involved in many
prisoner's dilemma-type situations with each other individ-
ual, and (2) each individual remembers how other individ-
uals behaved in past interactions. If we add to the model the
assumptions that the game is played more than once and that
the players keep track of what happened during their
3 Assuming that the “payoffs” in the dilemma have an impact on
fitness values.
4 Further, the fish can in fact be shown to solve this problem using
something very close to the Tit-for-Tat strategy we discuss below—
they studiously copy the last move performed by an individual fish
(with memory for particular individuals, not just all co-inspectors) and
begin by being “nice” (Dugatkin and Alfieri 1991, pp. 307–8).
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previous interactions with each other, then we can allow
players' choices in a particular interaction to depend on what
happened in the past. And this might give individuals an
incentive to cooperate: if they can elicit future cooperation
by cooperating now, the long-run payoff associated with
cooperating now might be higher than that associated with
defecting now.
As long as there is some chance that two individuals will
meet again, there is no best strategy independent of the
strategy used by the other player. In particular, unless the
other player is completely insensitive to what an individual
does (duplicating, in effect, the behavior of the non-iterated
prisoner's dilemma), “always defect” is not a very attractive
strategy. Strategies that can successfully elicit future coop-
eration from the other player will net a higher payoff. (And
strategies that can elicit future cooperation from the other
player while cooperating only minimally themselves will net
the highest payoff of all.) There is an enormously high
number of possible strategies, so the question of which
strategy generally does best—which strategy performs well
against a wide variety of strategies that may be employed by
other players—is difficult to answer analytically. Luckily,
though, we can shed some light on it experimentally. To do
so, Axelrod (1984) ran a very large iterated prisoner's di-
lemma tournament. He solicited entrants—computer pro-
grams each containing a strategy for playing the iterated
prisoner's dilemma—from professional game theorists and
received 14 entries in total. He then had each entrant com-
pete head-to-head against each other entrant, for five games
of 200 moves each. Each entrant's final score was the sum of
its scores in each pair-wise matchup.5 The strategies with
the highest final scores, surprisingly enough, possessed
some very “cooperative” characteristics. Most strikingly,
the top eight strategies, and none of the others, were “nice”:
they never played “defect” before their opponent did. Of
these top strategies, the most successful were “retaliatory”
but “forgiving”: they punished what Axelrod called “un-
called for” defection (1984, p. 44) but retained a “propensity
to cooperate” with that opponent nonetheless (1984, p. 36).
The highest-performing strategy, “Tit-for-Tat,” has all three
of these features: it cooperates on the first round, and then
on each subsequent round repeats the previous action of the
player with which it interacts. This implies that it is both
retaliatory (if the opponent defects, Tit-for-Tat will defect in
the next interaction) and forgiving (if the opponent cooper-
ates, even after a defection, Tit-for-Tat will cooperate in the
next interaction).
Axelrod then ran a second tournament with newly soli-
cited entries (this time 62). In this tournament, each pair-
wise matchup again played the iterated game five times,
each time with a finite number of rounds. But here, the
number of rounds was determined by setting the probability
that two strategies would meet again (i.e., that the game
would continue) to 0.99654.6 Interestingly enough, Tit-for-
Tat won again. And this was true even though the results of
the first tournament were publicly available and program-
mers could attempt to specifically devise a strategy that
would outperform it. The success of Tit-for-Tat appears to
be extremely robust. Here, it seems, is an opening for the
evolution of cooperative behavior.
The simple model developed by Axelrod has been dis-
cussed extensively throughout the literature. Skyrms has
described both the prisoner's dilemma results and a similar
game known as the stag hunt in the context of the evolution
of cooperation (Skyrms 2003), and has also applied these
insights to considering the development of the social con-
tract (Skyrms 1996). Sigmund (2010) has connected the
prisoner's dilemma and a handful of other games to phe-
nomena like learning, reputation, repetition, and public
goods (such as in the tragedy of the commons).
Further, researchers have repeatedly extended the basic
framework presented here in order to provide more robust
models of real-world behavior. The tournament has been
modified to include choice and refusal of partners (Stanley
et al. 1994), to cope with noise in signaling the choice to
cooperate or defect (Wu and Axelrod 1995), to interactions
between more than two players (Yao and Darween 1995),
and to include the effects of the spatial organization of
players in the interactions (Ferriere and Michod 1995).
Related models in evolutionary game theory have been
investigated that explore the punishment of defection
(Boyd et al. 2010), the choice to join either a group that
punishes or a group that fails to punish (Hauert et al. 2007),
the development of reward rather than punishment systems
(Rand et al. 2009), and the dispensation of rewards to
strangers who have in turn been kind to others (Ule et al.
2009). All these various extensions and expansions derive
from the fundamental idea of the iterated prisoner's dilemma
tournament.
5 We should think of the players in Axelrod's tournament as operating
under the fiction that the games were of unknown length. Many players
in this initial game, in fact, submitted strategies that appeared insensi-
tive both to actual and to expected game length.
6 The entrants knew this probability but did not know the number of
rounds that would be played. This eliminates the possibility of con-
structing strategies based on knowledge of when the game ends (e.g.,
199 cooperates followed by one defect in a 200-round game).
Table 1 Payoffs for each player (“A, B”) in the traditional prisoner's
dilemma (Axelrod 1984, p. 8)
B: Cooperate B: Defect
A: Cooperate 3, 3 (mutual cooperation) 0, 5 (“sucker's payoff”)
A: Defect 5, 0 (defector's payoff) 1, 1 (mutual defection)
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Strategies in Oyun: Finite State Machines
The real beauty of the iterated prisoner's dilemma as a
teaching tool for evolutionary game theory is the possibility
of students devising their own strategies—matching wits
with other players in an attempt to craft a new way to
succeed at the game. This is the purpose of Oyun: to provide
an environment where iterated prisoner's dilemma strategies
can be tested, refined, and explored. And, in particular,
Oyun allows for a class-wide tournament in which each
student can participate and in which the whole class can
see and discuss which strategies were successful and why as
a way of seeing which behavior might be evolutionarily
selected for.
The participants in Axelrod's original tournaments mostly
had an extensive background in computer programming. So
the challenge in creating a pedagogically useful computer-
run prisoner's dilemma tournament is to find a simple way to
represent even very complex strategies. Oyun solves this
problem by implementing strategies as finite state machines
(FSMs), which are simple, intuitive, and easy to represent
visually. A finite state machine for playing the iterated
prisoner's dilemma consists of a set of numbered “states,”
each of which is accompanied by instructions that specify
(1) what act to perform in that state (cooperate or defect) and
(2) how to respond to the other player's act in that state
(which state to move into if the other player cooperates and
which state to move into if the other player defects).
Consider the classic Tit-for-Tat strategy (TfT) described
above, which begins by cooperating and then responds by
duplicating the action that the opponent performed in the
last turn. Taking the initial state to be state #0,7 we might
diagram the finite state machine for TfT as in Fig. 1. In state
#0, the player cooperates. Looking at the arrows originating
from that state, we can see that if the opponent cooperates,
the player will remain in state #0 and so cooperate on the
next round. If the opponent defects, the player will move
into state #1 and therefore defect on the next round. And
similarly when in state #1: if the opponent cooperates, the
player will move to state #0, and therefore cooperate on the
next round, and if the opponent defects, the player will
remain in state #1. This finite state machine thus “encodes”
the Tit-for-Tat strategy.
There is a simple way to textually represent such a finite
state machine so that a computer can quickly run each finite
state machine against each other in an iterated tournament.
Simply list the three important facts about each state: the
action and where the two arrows lead. Oyun uses this very
simple format to encode finite state machines. In a plain text
file, each entrant lists, on separate lines, (1) the author's
name, (2) the name of the strategy, and (3) the number of
states in the finite state machine. Next, (4) the information
for each state is listed on a separate line, in numeric order
beginning with state #0, in the following format: “action,
{state to transition to if opponent cooperates}, {state to
transition to if opponent defects}.” The finite state machine
in Fig. 1 could thus be represented as follows:
John Doe
Tit-For-Tat
2
C, 0, 1
D, 0, 1
With a set of strategies gathered in this format, Oyun
automatically runs a tournament.8 Therefore, Oyun requires
minimal technical expertise on the part of both the student
and the instructor.
Running Tournaments with Oyun
Oyun allows for two varieties of tournaments. The first,
paralleling Axelrod's original tournament, is a round-robin
tournament, where every strategy is pitted against every
other strategy. In this type of tournament, each match is
formed of five “sub-matches,” whose lengths are each fixed
in Oyun. These lengths were determined by using Axelrod's
game-end probability of 0.00346 and are set at 168, 359,
306, 622, and 319 rounds. At the end of the tournament, the
points earned by each strategy in all its matches are
summed, and the strategy with the highest score is the
victor. Full data on the points scored by each strategy, and
even the precise sequence of moves executed during the
games, may be studied, or saved in a variety of export
7 This “zero-indexing” convention is common in computer program-
ming. We can think colloquially of the “zero-state” as that which a
player performs with no knowledge whatsoever of an opponent.
#0: Cooperate #1: Defect
if cooperate
if defect
if defect
if cooperate
Fig. 1 Diagram for a Tit-for-Tat finite state machine
8 Oyun also has two strategies built in: the Tit-for-Tat strategy and a
random player, which chooses cooperate or defect randomly, with
equal probability. The instructor can choose to include these in the
tournament or not. Note that Oyun does not currently provide a way for
students to submit “probabilistic” strategies, strategies in which a play-
er's action on a given round is not determined by the history of the
game but only probabilistically related to it.
470 Evo Edu Outreach (2012) 5:467–476
formats. We will see two example sets of results from a
round-robin tournament in the next section, in Figs. 2 and 4.
The second variety of tournament is an “evolutionary”
tournament. In this tournament, Oyun begins with a “popu-
lation” which is uniformly distributed across all submitted
strategies. For each strategy S, at each generation, Oyun
then calculates a “relative fitness” as follows: for each
possible opponent O, compute the score that S receives
against O, multiply the result by the prevalence of O in the
population, and sum over each O (S's “absolute fitness”);
then, set the prevalence of the strategy S in the next gener-
ation to its relative fitness (its absolute fitness score divided
by the sum of absolute fitnesses over all strategies) in the
current generation. Put more colloquially, we begin with an
equally mixed population and then compute how well each
type does at each generation, converting the payoffs directly
into the population frequencies in the next generation. Oyun
repeats this process for as many generations as the user
specifies, and records and graphs the relative fitness of each
strategy over time. The results from this type of tournament
may be saved as a graph or a spreadsheet for further anal-
ysis. We will also see a sample result from an evolutionary
tournament in the next section, in Fig. 3.
Oyun in the Classroom: Two Examples
This section presents two examples of the kind of ingenuity
that may be deployed by students in developing prisoner's
dilemma strategies. At the time of writing, the iterated
prisoner's dilemma tournament has been run three times
using Oyun, once at Princeton University and twice at UC
Berkeley.9 In each case, after having read and discussed
Axelrod (1984), the students were instructed to create finite
state machine strategies for a tournament of the sort de-
scribed earlier. The expectation, of course, is that Tit-for-
Tat will prove victorious, as it did in Axelrod's large tour-
nament. In fact, this was not the case: even though TfT was
submitted by many students in each tournament, in none of
the tournaments thus far has it been the victor. Indeed, the
students came up with two separate sorts of innovations that
allowed their strategies to beat TfT.
The first innovation involved several students coordinat-
ing with each other to submit complementary strategies (this
occurred both in the Princeton tournament and in the first
Berkeley tournament—in the latter, two separate groups of
students coordinated their strategies).10 In each case,
entrants from the colluding group recognized each other
via a “secret handshake.” The handshake consisted in each
entrant performing a seemingly random series of moves,
provided it continued to get the “right” response from the
other entrant on each round. Once the handshake was com-
pleted and colluders recognized each other, they executed
the following strategy. One of the colluders became the
“parasite,” entering an all-defect loop, and the other col-
luders all become the “hosts,” entering an all-cooperate
loop. This resulted in a massive payoff for the parasite: on
each round after the handshake, the parasite received five
points and the host zero. Given that the non-colluding
tournament entrants were each receiving three points per
round for cooperating with each other and were unable to
consistently take advantage of each other, a parasite won
each round-robin tournament by a large margin (see Fig. 2
for a reproduction of the output from a similar tournament,
restricted to one parasite, one host, a Tit-for-Tat player, and
a Random player; the host and parasite strategies are repro-
duced in the Appendix).
The results are equally interesting when we move from a
round-robin to an evolutionary tournament. While the para-
site is highly successful in early generations, the host has
helped the parasite at the expense of almost all of its possi-
ble payoff, and so its fraction in future generations declines
very quickly (Fig. 4). How does the parasite perform? Each
of the three groups who colluded had a different strategy,
and this made a difference in how the parasite performed
over the long run.
One interesting difference between the groups that col-
luded was in how they programmed the “hosts” to respond
to players they recognized not to be the parasite. Some
students designed their hosts to play all-defect when the
secret handshake failed, and others designed their hosts to
play Tit-for-Tat when the secret handshake failed (note that
in all of the cases, the parasite played Tit-for-Tat when the
handshake failed, since the students reasoned that Tit-for-
Tat would be the most successful “single” strategy). The
former strategy led to the parasite winning by a higher
margin in the non-evolutionary tournament, but the latter
strategy kept the hosts in the evolutionary tournament lon-
ger, and thus gave the parasite a boost for more rounds.
Another difference lay in the secret handshake itself. Recall
that a “nice” strategy, that is never the first to defect, gener-
ally outperforms a “nasty” strategy. Two of the three groups
made the parasite's side of the secret handshake nice: it did
9 The Princeton tournament was run during Adam Elga's “Philosophy
of Science” course in spring 2005, and the Berkeley tournaments were
run during –Lara Buchak's- “Philosophy and Game Theory” course in
spring 2009 and fall 2010.
10 A similar effect occurred in a “20th-anniversary” version of
Axelrod's tournament run at the 2004 Conference on Evolutionary
Computation (Kendall et al. 2007). Of course, one might wonder about
the rationality of the strategies of some of the group members (the
“hosts,” a designation we will explain shortly).
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not defect until after there was a defection in the other side
of the secret handshake. This meant that the parasite would
be nice generally: it would never be the first to defect
against non-colluding players, either. For the other group,
the parasite was the first to defect even against non-
colluding entrants, and so was slowly driven out of the
population by the ever-so-slight inefficiency of its secret
handshake. Figure 3 represents the result of an evolutionary
tournament in which the parasite was “nasty” (in this exam-
ple, both the host and the parasite play Tit-for-Tat when the
secret handshake goes foul). Nasty parasites, as we can see,
are driven out of the population by TfT in the long run.
The strategy implemented by the parasite and (willing)
host mimics some behavior in nature. Most saliently, it
seems to mimic that of species like the social hymenopter-
ans (such as ants, bees, and wasps), where some individuals
(sterile workers) seem to willingly take on a massive fitness
cost (namely, sterility) (Keller and Chapuisat 2010). Of
course, the dynamics of the evolutionary process in our
simulations here are far too simplistic to effectively model
the emergence of this sort of eusociality, since, for example,
in our simulation organisms can only produce future
organisms of their own strategy type. Still, examining strat-
egies like these provides an inroad into understanding the
fitness benefits of treating members of an in-group differ-
ently from those of an out-group and why organisms might
evolve to do so (see, e.g., Page and Mitchell 1998).
The other interesting innovation, which occurred in both
Berkeley tournaments, was the introduction of a strategy
feature that seemingly improved on Tit-for-Tat. If we re-
move the host/parasite group strategies from the two tourna-
ments that included them and also consider the third
tournament, then it is still the case that in none of these
tournaments did Tit-for-Tat win. In the modified Princeton
tournament, Tit-for-Two-Tats won [as it would have, inci-
dentally, had it been submitted to Axelrod's first tournament
(Axelrod 1984, p. 39)], and in the Berkeley tournaments,
two strategies called AW and Consolation Prizefighter won
(all three of these strategies are reproduced in the
Appendix). All three strategies share with Tit-for-Tat the
features of being nice and of responding to enough defec-
tions with a “retaliatory” defection. The Berkeley strategies
were particularly interesting because of two ways in which
they were different from Tit-for-Tat. The first difference is
Fig. 2 Example results demonstrating the victory of a “parasite” finite state machine in a one-shot tournament. Note especially the score in the Host vs.
Parasite matchup: 8,820 points to the parasite, 60% higher than the all-cooperate score of 5,322
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that they tried to restore cooperation after a “retaliatory”
defection by including “unsolicited” cooperation. But the
really interesting difference is that once the opponent
defected enough total times, they each reverted to all-
defect for the rest of the game. These strategies were there-
fore successful not only because they were good at inducing
and maintaining cooperation but also because they were
good at recognizing strategies that would not respond to
inducement (including totally unresponsive strategies like
Random) and spent the rest of the game defecting against
them. And this seems to mirror an adaptive feature of
organisms, often called “cheater detection”: if another indi-
vidual cannot be induced to cooperate regularly, abandon
efforts to promote social behavior (see, e.g., Stevens and
Hauser 2004).
Implementation and Use
Oyun is available free of charge at http://charlespence.net/
oyun and is designed to be cross-platform, running on
Windows, Mac OS X, and Linux computers. It is open-
source, and the source code is available for download under
the GNU General Public License.
Available on the Oyun website are a variety of materials
for users. The user's manual can be read online, and a PDF
Fig. 3 Example results taking the same strategies from Fig. 2 and
placing them in a 200-generation evolutionary tournament. The host is
the lowest (worst-performing) line on the graph, only slightly
outcompeted by the random strategy. We see the parasite (top line at
left) initially perform very well, but eventually be outcompeted by Tit-
for-Tat (the center line) around generation 145
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copy of the manual is included when one downloads the
program installer (for Mac or Windows). This manual
includes screenshots and descriptions of each of the steps
required to run the various varieties of tournaments de-
scribed here.
To execute a classroom tournament, only the instructor
needs to have the Oyun software installed, though students
may install the software themselves to familiarize them-
selves with the format and test out various strategies.
Understanding the prisoner's dilemma requires relatively
little background in game theory, and the finite state ma-
chine format can be introduced in less than a class period to
students with no background in computer science or
college-level mathematics; however, some level of basic
technical competence is needed. The example strategies that
are available on the Oyun website can be used to illustrate
how finite state machines work. Once all the entrants have
been turned in to the instructor, a second class period suffi-
ces to run the tournament in public and discuss the results
with the students. The instructor must run the tournament in
advance herself in order to verify that there are no improp-
erly formatted strategies; to discern the interesting “global”
trends, such as the relative performance of nasty and nice
strategies; and to pick examples of how strategies performed
against each other to discuss in class. The running of almost
all varieties of tournaments (we have tested sizes up to 40 or
50 entrants) is nearly instantaneous—this can be effectively
performed as a demonstration on a laptop connected to an
overhead projection system. However, since larger tourna-
ments make the data complicated to look at, we recommend
the instructor prepare summary statistics or simulations with
a smaller subset of the strategies in advance for ease of
discussion.
The authors are glad to provide support for the software
in the future. If users have trouble downloading, installing,
or using Oyun, they should first check the website to see if
their issue has been discussed there. Contact information is
available in this article and on the website.
Conclusions
Oyun is a freely available, cross-platform program that
makes it simple for students to deploy iterated prisoner's
Fig. 4 Example results from a round-robin tournament including a
strategy that beats Tit-for-Tat outright (in this case, “AW”). Note that
when AW plays Tit-for-Tat, it scores the same 5,322 points as Tit-for-
Tat scores against itself (the all-cooperate score). Against Random,
however, AW scores 5,159 points (due to its all-defect trigger), while
Tit-for-Tat scores only 3,904
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dilemma strategies in both traditional, Axelrod-type
tournaments, and “evolutionary” tournaments that make
the connection between evolutionary game theory and
population change explicit. At the present time, Oyun
has met with success in multiple classroom deploy-
ments, allowing students to experience evolutionary
modeling in a new and exciting way. We anticipate that
it can potentially be a useful tool for a wide variety of
teachers in different classroom environments.
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Appendix: Selected Student Entries
Jane Doe
Tit-for-Two-Tats
3
C, 0, 1
C, 1, 2
D, 0, 1
Urocerus gigas
Host
12
C, 1, 11
C, 2, 11
C, 3, 11
D, 7, 4
C, 5, 6
C, 5, 5
C, 6, 6
C, 8, 8
C, 9, 9
C, 10, 10
C, 10, 11
D, 10, 11
Rhyssa persuasoria
Parasite
12
C, 1, 11
C, 2, 11
C, 3, 11
D, 7, 4
D, 5, 6
D, 5, 5
C, 6, 6
C, 8, 8
C, 9, 9
C, 10, 10
C, 10, 11
D, 10, 11
Angelo Wong
AW
19
C, 0, 1
D, 1, 2
C, 2, 3
C, 3, 4
D, 4, 5
C, 5, 6
C, 6, 7
C, 7, 8
C, 8, 9
D, 9, 10
C, 10, 11
C, 11, 12
C, 12, 13
C, 13, 14
C, 14, 15
C, 15, 16
C, 16, 17
C, 17, 18
D, 18, 18
Robert Justin Sutton
Consolation Prizefighter
20
C, 0, 1
D, 2, 2
C, 3, 3
C, 3, 4
D, 5, 5
D, 6, 6
C, 7, 7
C, 7, 8
D, 9, 9
D, 10, 10
D, 11, 11
C, 12, 12
C, 12, 13
D, 14, 14
D, 15, 15
D, 16, 16
D, 17, 16
D, 18, 19
C, 18, 19
D, 19, 19
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